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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE Q~F UTAH
JAMES H. STARI{EY and
JAMES HAROLD STARKEY,
for himself and for all other
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9'897

BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESP·ONDENT'S BRIEF
THE FACTS
The factual situation represented by the Respondent
is substantially as follows:
The Board of Education of Davis County School
District is the governing body of said District which composes all of Davis County, Utah. The County lying as it
does between Salt Lake and Ogden, the two most populous cities of the state, has many residents who work
1
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outside the County. However, the residence of such
families adds tremendously to an already Federally Impacted Area. The result of its geographical location and
the important military bases located therein has created
an enormous pupil growth in the past decade.
This burgeoning growth has increased, emphasized
and aggravated the social and moral problems inherent
in the administration, regulation, education and discipline of this vast number of pupils. One of the most
serious problems is early school age marriages with the
attendant "Drop Outs" and the problems necessarily
involved in the comingling of married students with single teenagers together with the social and moral phases
incident to this mixed relationship.
Recognizing these problems the Board of Education
after prolonged study and consultation ( R. 48) passed
the Resolution in question. Counsel f.or appellant quoted
only an excerpt from said Resolution which they deem
to be pertinent to this issue. The entire Resolution should
be read as a whole to understand fully the reasoning and
thinking ~of the Board as to the ba.sis for passing said
Resolution. It should not be read piecemeal as suits the
purpose of appellant. The Resolution in its entirety is as
follows:
''Recently ·considerable concern has been expressed to the Board of Education relating to the
influence of married students attending school
with other students. Since occasionally married
students have be·come the most pron1inent members of athletic teams and have held student body
and class offices, a kind of glamour might be associated with such a marriage which may have the

2
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effect of lending encouragement to young marriages. Furthermore, when students assume the
responsibilities of marriage and parenthood, they
represent a different culture and maturity from
those of the unmarried students. As these students move from the society of the single to that
of the married their new social interest and
change of life patterns are •SO drastically different
as to make it seem unwise and incompatible to
leave them in positions of leadership among the
unmarried students. Such time as they have free
from their studies should logically be used in
home-planning and income-earning responsibilities, instead of being involved in the activities
with unmarried members of the student body.
''The members of the Board of Education
feel an obligation to employ all efforts to discourage early marriage. They feel that lines should
be drawn and policies established which will focus
attention to the fact that our public schools are
composed of a young, immature society, all of
whom, with an occasional exception, are eighteen
years of age or younger.
"The Board of Education hereby resolves
that no married student shall be permitted to participate as a student body or class officer, on athletic teams or in tho,se extracurricular activities
which are separate and apart from the regular
daily class schedules and expectations for graduation requirements, except wherein married students are presently holding office, such students
may continue to do so for the Temainder of the
1961-62 school year. Furthermore, presently married students may continue in athletics only until
the end of the 1962-~63 ~school year. This continued
participation in either the holding of office or in
activities shall be subject to good behavior and

3
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proper execution of duty as determined by the
school officials concerned.
''It is further understood that if any married
student fails to conform to the proper standards
of citizenship, he or ·she may be dismi,ssed immediately.
"It is further resolved that a student shall
not attend ·school during her period of pregnancy.
"This resolution becomes effective as of the
date of passage.
"Dated: January 8, 1962"
Nothing that the student is taking for credit or graduation i,s affected by the Resolution (R. 42, 45, 46, 49, 52
and 53). Extracurricular activities are carried on outside of regular s·chool hours (R. 50)
The balance of the factual ·situation is substantially
as set forth by appellant under his statement of facts.
ARGUMENT

I.
THIS IS NOT A PROPER CASE FOR
REMEDY BY WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS. EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES LIE \\'ITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY PO\VER.S OF THE BOARD
AND THERE IS NO QUESTION OF LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. THE PROCEEDINGS COMPLAINED OF HAVE BEEN
COMPLETED AND TERM~INATED AND
THERE IS NO LAW \VHICH SPECIALLY
ENJOINS THE P.ERFOR~1:ANCE OF ANY
ACT NOW IN ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT.
4
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As a preliminary consideration Respondent re.spectfully submits that Plaintiff has misconceived his remedy,
if any he ever had. Neither of those writs is appropriate
to operate in a field where administrative boards are invested with discretionary powers as are here involved.
\Vrits of Prohibition and Mandate operate only within
the realm of the absolute, not in the realm of discretion.
The hi.storical nature and function of the Writ of
Prohibition has been to arrest proceedings of an inferior
court or tribunal wherein they threaten to make determinations upon matters over which they have no jurisdiction. In order for a \Vrit of Prohibition to be proper
it must appear that there is a total want or an excess of
jurisdiction, Yearian v. Spiers, 10 P. 609, 4 U. 385, and it
will .not issue to prevent or correct erroneous exercise of
matters properly within the jurisdiction of the inferior
court or tribunal, Ca1npbell v. Durand, 115 P, 986, 39 U.
118; Atwood v. Cox, 55 P. 2d 377, 88 U. 437. In an article
found at 37 Canadian Bar Review 294, (1959), the author,
D. C. M. Yeardley, fellow of St. Edmond Hall, Oxford,
.states that ''The only common and generally recognized
ground for Prohibition both in England and Canada is
that of defective jurisdiction.'' See also 42 Am. Jr., Prohibition, Sec. 19.
It is clear that the Legislature has given the local
Board of Education the jurisdiction to concern itself with
matters such as that now before the Court under the
provisions of Section 53-6-20, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, wherein it is stated that "Every Board of Education ... may do all things needful for the maintenance,
prosperity and success of the schools, and the pr:omotion

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of education and may adopt by-laws and rules for its own
procedure, and make and enforce all needful rules and
regulations for control and management of the pubUc
schools of the d'istrict'' (Italics ours). When an inferior
court or tribunal is acting within the scope of its jurisdiction a vVrit of Prohibition is not a proper substitute
and cannot be converted into a Writ of Review, particularly, when there are other plain, speedy and adequate
remedies at law available to the applicant as there are in
this case, Oldroyd v. McCrea, 235 P. 580, 65 U. 142; Campbell Building Co. v. District Court, 63 P. 2d 255, 90 U.
552, 42 Am. J ur. 165, Prohibition, Section 30.
In addition to denying a vVrit of Prohibition on the
Grounds that there is no question of excess or lack of
jurisdiction and that there are other plain, speedy and
adequate remedies available to Plaintiff, the Writ of Prohibition should be denied on the further ground that it
is the office of Prohibition to ''arrest the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board of person,'' Rule 65B
(b) (4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This statutory
provision is in keeping with the judicial concept that the
'Vrit of Prohibition is preventive rather than corrective,
and should issue only to prevent the commission of a
future act, and not to undo one which has already been
perfor·med, IJ;fartineau v. Crabbe, 150 P. 301, 46 U. 237;
Sheriff v. Board of Commissioners, 268 P. 783, 71 U. 593.
The facts, stipulations and findings now before the Court
in this matter clearly reveal that the Board of Education
has completed all actions by and through which the Resolution was adopted and applied with respect to Plaintiff
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and \Yrit of Prohibition is therefore an improper remedy
in the premises.
It is further submitted on behalf of the Board of
Education that a \Vrit of Mandamus is not a proper
remedy for Plaintiff to pursue in the matter now before
the Court. Rule 65B (b) ( 3), U t.ah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that ~fandamus shall issue only to compel
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office. Mandamus should never
be granted in questionable situations, Snyder v. Emerson, 57 P. 300, 19 U. 319, and the legal right to require a
person, court or tribunal to proceed and the legal duty to
do so must be free from doubt, Hoffman v. Lewis, 87 P.
167, 31 U. 179; Haslam v. Mo-rrison, 190 P. 2d 520, 113 U.
147; Hamblin v. State Board of Land Commissioners,
187 P. 178, 55 U. 402; State v. Moorehouse, 112 P. 169, 38
U. 324. Where a Writ of Mandamus is ,sought to compel
public officers to do certain acts, the right of the Plaintiff
to have the act performed must be clear, and the corresponding duty upon the offi·cer to be required to act must
be correspondingly plain and clear, and not open to s·erious question, Woodcock v. Board of Education, 187 P. 181,
55 U. 458,10 A.L.R.181; Towler v. Warenski, 202 P. 374,
59 U. 171. If the matter sought to be compelled is within
the discretionary jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal or
board, Writ of Mandamus may issue to compel such
board to act on the matter but not to control its jurisdiction while acting or to compel performance in a particular way nor to reverse the judgment when it has been
made, Tuttle v. Board of Education, 294 P. 294, 77 U.
270; Hathaway v. McConkie, 38 P. 2d 300, 85 U. 21. Re-
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spondent Board of Education submits that there i,s no
law specially enjoining the Board of Education to provide Plaintiff with extracurricular activity and that this
matter is entirely within the discretion of said Board of
Education and that Mandamus is not a proper remedy in
the premises.
The Board of Education therefore, respectfully submits that upon the reasoning and authority cited above,
neither a Writ of Prohibition nor a \Yrit of Mandamus
is a proper remedy for Plaintiff to pursue in the matter
now pending before the Court.

II
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES ARE
PRIVILEGES ESTABLISHED SEPARATE
AND APART F,ROM THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND MAY BE ESTABLISHED OR
CONDUCTED SOLELY \\TITHIN DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION.
Plaintiff assails what he claims to be Superintendent Holt's definition of "Extracurricular Activities''
and then ·calls that definition "capricious, discriminatory and violative of the Constitution.'' Plaintiff stands
on false ground. We are not in thi.s case to determine
whether or not Superintendent Holt's definition of
''Extracurricular Activities'' is or is not accurate. We
are considering the validity of the action of the Board
as set forth in the resolution. This court has already,
in the Beard case, infra, decided the nature of extracurricular activities.

8
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Although Superintendent Holt's definition is not
determinative of these is,sues it should be noted that
Plaintiff has inaccurately set forth Superintendent Holt's
position.
Appellant contends that Superintendent Holt included athletics, Usher Squad and the position of Vice
President of the Boy's As,sociation within his definition
of extracurricular activities and excluded Band, Debate,
A Cappella Choir, Opera and School Plays. An accurate
reading of the r·ecord clearly show,s that Band, Debate,
A Cappella Choir, Opera and School Play are activities
which are either primarily or ·entirely carried on in the
classroom. As such they are not considered by Superintendent Holt to be extracurricular activities. However,
there may be certain facets to these endeavors which
may be properly considered as extracurricular activities.
For example, the band may play at school gam·es or the
A Cappella choir may give an evening Christmas program
away from the ~school. Superintendent Holt makes it
clear that students who participate in these endeavors
receive their credit toward graduation for the work
which they perform in the classroom rather than for
the participation in the outside activities (R. 52, 53).
Superintendent Holt's testimony shows that when these
activities are held as a class they are not considered
extracurricular activities (R. 48, 49) and that only
those incidental activities held outside the class, and
having no bearing on grade or credit, are properly to
be considered as extracurricular activities.

In Beard v. Board of Eduoation, 16 P. 2d 900, 81 U.
51, this Court recognized the place of extracurricular
9
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activities in a modern school system. In speaking of the
establishment of extracurricular activities as desireable supplements to the required school curriculum, this
Court stated at page 904:
"These are useful and wholesome preventive
1neasures which save children from delinquency
and the state from additional expense in connection with penal institutions. Su..ch activities,
so far as conducted in connection with the school,
are usually termed extra c-urricular activities, for
the reason that, while they are necessary in a
modern schoo-l system, they are in excess of the
minimum requirements of a school cun·,iculum."
(Italics ours.)
In referring to certain sections of the Compiled
Laws of Utah, 1917, which used the term "supervised
recreational activity," the Court stated=
" ... these are activities which the Board itself
may inaugurate and make provisions for proper
supervision. The term "recreational activity'' includes in its general meaning games, sports and
plays . . . and dances. All such activities are
·included within the meaning of the term "·entertainm<:mt." The Board 'may, but is not required
to provide these activities and supervise them in
the interest of public morals and welfare. (Italics
ours.)
·
In determining that it was proper for the Board of
Education to permit the establishment of an organized
Student Body through which extracurricular activities
wer·e organized and administered, the court said at page

906:
''While not required by statute as part of the
minimum educational program.... it is within the
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power, of the Board of Education to autho·rize
and maintain such an organization as one of the
required educational activities and as part of the
educational system of the district. This it may do
pursuant to the provisions of Section (53-6-20,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953,) wherein it is empowered ''to do all things needful for the maintenance, prosperity and success of the schools and
the promotion of education.'' (Italics ours.)
"The evidence shows that the student body organization was authorized by the Board of Education of the district, and that the constitution
adopted by the student body had the sanction and
approval of the Board.''
Thus, the Court held that the Board of Education
may allow the establishment of a student body organization through which extracurricular activities may be
planned and administered and so stated at page 907:
''That the student body organization and
proper activities thereof are part of the educational syste·m of the district we think admits of
no doubt. The scope of its activity, as indicated
by the constitution (referring to the student body
constitution), shows a purpose closely related to
the school curriculum, although not required
thereby, and is certainly within what is now regarded by all educators as a modern educational
system.'' (Italics ours.)
The holding of Beard v. Bo·ard of Education is,
therefore, that the local Boards of Education may permit and allow the establishment of extracurricular activities even though such a program is not required t9
be established. The case further holds that the establishment of such a program is discretionary with the Board
11
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of Education and the Court so indicates at page 909 of
its opinion:
"It does not follow, however, that every activity
that may be engaged in by the student body is
part of the modern educational program. The
student may not do more than the Board of
Education may authorize or approve, or do anything that is prohibited by law.''
We ·call the Court's attention to the following additional portions of this Court's holding in the Beard case
which are very pertinent here :
'' * * * It is well established that, if the action of
the board of education is within the powers conferred upon it by the Legislature, and pertains
to a matter in which the board is vested with
authority to act, the courts will not review the
action of such a board to substitute its judgment
for that of the board as to matters within its
discretion.
* * * *
'' 'The courts will not interfere with the exercise
of discretion by school directors in matters confided by law to their judgment, unless there is
a clear abuse of the discretion, or a violation of
law. So the courts are usually disinclined to interfere with regulations adopted by school boards,
and they will not consider whether the regulations
are wise or expedient, but merely whether they
are a reasonable exercise of the power and discretion of the board. Acting reasonably within
the powers conferred, it is the proYince of the
board of education to determine what things are
detrimental to the successful management, good
order, and discipline of the schools and the rules
required to produce these conditions. The presumption is always in favor of the reasonable-
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ness .and propriety of a rule or regulation duly
made. The reasonableness of regulations IS a
question of law for the courts.' ''

* * * *
''The court, in its findings of fact, found that the
student body was organized by the students of
the school by and with the permission of the
board of education 'for the government of themselves and their carrying on of student social and
entertainment activities not contemplated by the
school curriculum,' and that the dances, motion
picture shows, lyceum lectures, and musicales,
games, and athletic contests about which complaint is made are conducted by the student body,
and that a fee is charged for admission to· su.ch
entertainments, and that no part of the income
goes to the school treasury to cover the cost of
heating, lighting, janitorial, and other service·s."
(Italics ours).
'' Tha.t the student body organization and proper
activities thereof are part of the educational sys-:
tem of the district we think admits of no doubt.
The scope of its activity, as indicated by the constitutiolfl·, shows a purpose closely related to the
school curriculum, although not required thereby,
and 'tS certa.inly within what is now regarded by
all educators as a modern educational system.''
(Italics ours.)
The views of Beard v. Board of Education, Supra,
have been enunci.ated in other courts of the United
States. In Cochrane v. Board of Education, 1.03 N.W. 2d
569 (Michigan, 1960), the Supreme Court of Michigan
affirmed the dedsion of a lower court which had held
valid a school resolution prohibiting married students
from participating in extracurricular activities. In
the .affirming opinion of Justice Kavanaugh it was recog-
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nized that extracurricular activities may be furnished
but that there is no obligation to do so. In speaking of
inter-scholastic games, particularly football, Justice
Kavanaugh stated:
''Football conte,sts between schools are extracurricular in nature. The right to provide such
activity is clearly recognized. Constitutional provisions and statutes giving the right to receive
education and physical training cannot properly
be said to include inter-scholastic sports as nec·essary ·requirements of education.''
The Board of Education recognize,s its responsibilities and duty to furnish students with phy;sical education. However, a distinction should be made between
physical education included within the curriculum and
inter-school or inter-scholastic athletics which are considered extracurricular. The distinction is set forth in
State v. La;wrence Circuit Court, 162 N.E. 2d 250 (Indiana, 1959) wherein it is stated:
''The difference between physical education or
phy;sical training included within the curriculum
of public schools and inter-school or inter-scholastic athletics, which are generally considered extracurricular, is discussed in an authoritative opinion by Senator John W. Bricker when he was
Attorney General of Ohio . . . from which we
quote:
" ... in the light of the holding and reasonings of these Courts, I am of the opinion
that the term 'physical education' which the
statutes of Ohio direct shall be included in
. the curriculum of the public schools of Ohio
does not include what is commonly called
'inter-scholastic athletics', that is, the play-
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ing of games in competition by picked teams
representing the several schools. Inter-scholastic athletics is not a proper public school
activity within the scope of 'physical educa~
tion' as the term is used in our statutes."
The Respondent Board of Education makes this
same differentiation between physical education and
extracurricular activities. The testimony of Superintendent Holt shows that requirements are fulfilled and credit
given toward graduation solely on the basis of physical
education which is perfoTmed during school hours and
not for participation in extracurricular athletic activities
which take place after the close of school (R. 52).

State v. Lawrence Circuit Court, Supra, held that
the right to go to public ~school and receive education
and training does not include the right to participate
in inter-scholastic games and the court went on to sa~
in its opinion:
''We believe the foregoing authorities are de~
cisive of the question before us and that the
right of Plaintiff under the Indiana Constitution and Statutes to go to the public s-chools and
receive educ.ation and training cannot properly
be said to include inter- seholastic sports and
games, viz: inter-school basketball as may be engaged in between picked teams of the various
public, private and parochial schools constituting
the membership of relator athletic association.''
A similar problem confronted the Supreme Court of
Washington in Wayland v. Board of School Directors,
86 P. 642, wherein the Board of Education had adopted
a rule that all students thereafter becoming members
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of any high school fraternity should be denied all the
pri vi1eges of the high school except those of the class
room. In affirming a decision of the lower court upholding the Resolution of the Board of Education the court
said at page 643:
"It will be observed that no attempt is being made
by the respondents to deny appellant any instruction afforded by class work or by the required
curriculum of the school. He is only denied certain other privileges such as participation in athletic, literary, military, musical, or class organization. In other words, the respondent made it
optional with appellant to determine whether,
against the known wishes of the school authoritie,s, he would continue his membership in said
secret society, and thereby forfeit participation
in the privileges above mentioned, which were
no poart of the "Class or curriculum, or whether by
complying with the adopted rules, he would elect
to enjoy the privileges of which he is now deprived.'' (Italics ours.)
The Court also stated at page 644:
''Respondents are only seeking to prev·ent appellant and his as,sociates from dictating the
terms on which they shall enjoy certain privileges
which are merely incidental to the regular school
work, and this they have authority to do.''
Based upon the record and authority referred to
herein, Respondent Board of Education submits that
extracurricular activities are supplementary to the requirred ·curriculum, but that they are not required, and
if they are made a part of the curriculum, which these
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are not, they would then be made .so solely within the discretionary powers of the Board of Education.
Some of the cases cited by appellant are not discussed by us in this brief for the reason that the Court
will itself immediately observe that they pertain primarily to racial problems which are not in point here or
fa-ctual situations unrelated to our issue, or are cited by
ours·elves in this brief as authorities for the position of
Respondent.
III.
IF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION SEES
FIT TO INSTITUTE A PROGRAM OF EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES IT HAS
THE DUTY, POWER, AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION I~ PROMOTING THE WELFARE
AND EFFICIENCY OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM BY ESTABLISHING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF GUIDANCE IN DET,ERMINING UNDER WHAT
CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES STUDENTS MAY AVAIL THEMSELVES OF
THOSE PRIVILEGES.
The Board of Education of the Davis County
School District recognizes the supplementary benefits
which may be derived from the institution of a program
of extracurricular activities and has seen fit to exercise
its discretion in a manner providing for the establishment of such a program. Once such a program is established and these activities provided, it is proper for the
board to supervise them in the interest of public morals
and welfare. As stated above, Section 53-6-20, Utah
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Code Annotated, 1953, gives the Board of F~ducation the
power to "do all things needful for the maintenance,
prosperity and success of the schools, and the promotion
of education; and (to) make and enforce all needful
rules and regulations for the control and management
of the public schools of this District.''
Section 53-14-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
''It shall be the duty of all district boards of education, boards of education of the cities of the
first and second class, foru1ns, and classes supported in whole or in part by the state of Utah
to provide that persons employed to give instruction and guidance to young people under eighteen
years of age, shall so arrange and present their
instruction, guidance and plans for pupil and
student thinking, discussion, decision and activity as shall give special emphasis to con1mon honesty, morality, courtesy, obedience to law, respect
for the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Utah, respect for parents and home, the dignity and necessity of honest labor and other skills, habits and qualities
of character which will promote an upright and
desirable citizenry and which will better prepare
our youth for a richer, happier life. (Italics ours.)
The responsibility of establishing rules and regulation f.or participation in extracurricular activities is,
therefore, properly within the province of the local
B·oard of Education. Should they decide, in the exercise
of the discretion vested in them under Section 53-6-20,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that the prosperity, success
an.d welfare of the S·Chools and the achievement of those
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goals set forth in Section 53-14-10, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, can more properly be served and achieved by not
allowing married students to participate in these extracurricular ictivities, then the Board of Education has
exercised tpe discretion vested in it by the Constitution
and Statutes of the State of Utah and People of Davis
County and such discretionary determination should not
be interfered with by the Courts of this state as was
so well ·stated by this court in the Beard ·Case and in
many other cases of which the following are a few=

Sta.te v. Packer Corporation, 77 U. 500, 297 P.
1013.
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dist., 106
U. 55, 145 P. 2d 503.
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System,
122 u. 44, 246 p. 2d 591.
The Ke'nt Club v.
870.

Torm~to,

6 U. 2d 67, 305 P. 2d

Davis v. Ogden City, 117 U. 315, 215 P. 2d 616.
State v. Twitchell, 8 U. 2d 314, 333 P. 2d 1075
Abrahamson v. Board of Rev. of Ind. Oomm., 3 U.
2d 289, 283 p. 2d 213.
All education, whether curricular or extracurricular,
is, ,and must be based upon the classification of individuals in accordance with their past grow·th and development and their present potentialities as was stated by
this court in the Kowallis case, infra. No doubt, even
plaintiff would agree that during his years in the grade
school, Junior High School .and High School he was
studying and developing, mentally and physically, along
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with other individuals of his age who, up until his
marriage, had had similar experience as to background
and training. The "uniform ,system'' that the Utah Constitution requires, has inherent within it, a demand for
.classification of the students on the basi's of past experience to insure uniform instruction to all students in that
age group.
'Vould plaintiff contend that a "uniform system''
required that all ·students be permitted to play baseball
regardless of age, sex or aptitude~ Would plaintiff contend that a child of tender age should, if he demanded,
be permitted to attend the classes given to more mature
students with reference to moral problems as encountered
during adolescence~ The proposition answers itself.
There has to be classification of students for study and
there likewise should be classification of participants in
extracurricular activities. Under the law the Board of
Education is vested with exclusive authority to exercise
its discretion in determining these classifi.cations and in
determining the types of individuals who may qualify for
the various activities.
Having exercised its discretion the Court should not
disturjb the decision unless it is manifestly wrong, unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.
In dealing with a matter almost identical with that
now before the Court, the Supreme Court of Michigan
affirmed this principle in Cochrane v. Board of Education,
Supra, wherein Justice Kavanaugh stated:
"It necessarily follows that those in charge of the
school 1nust be allowed to judge and to detern1ine
20
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the propriety of allowing .married students to participate in the playing of football on the high
schoo1 team. It is manifest that those in charge of
the schools, and not the Courts, are better qualified to determine when and under what circumstances a student may be allowed to play football
under the banner of the high school team. ''
It is Respondent's belief that the statute·s of the State of
Utah referred to ~above confer upon it the duty, power,
authority and jurisdiction to exercise its discretion in
the matter now before the court and that said discretion
has been properly exercised by the adoption of the Res-olution of January 8, 1962 and that the Court should not
substitute its discretion for that of the Board of Education. The people of Davis County have seen fit to vest
this dis-cretionary power within the Board of Education
through the exercise of Democratic election procedures.
And any objection to the manner of ·exercising this discretion may be remedied in that s-ame manner. Allen v.
Board of Education, 236 P. 2d 756, 120 U. 556.

IV.
THE RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 8, 1962
WAS ADOPTED AS AN EXERCISE OF THE
DISCRETION VESTED IN THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION BY THE CONSTITUTION AND
STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND
PEOPLE OF DAVIS COUNTY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROMOTING THE WELFARE AND
EFFICIENCY OF THE SCHOOLS \VITHIN
THE DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRCT
AND WAS NOT UNREASON·ABLE, ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR AN ABUSE OF
21
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THE DISCRETION
BOARD.

VESTED

IN

SAID

It has been pointed out by reference to Sections 536-20 and 53-14-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that the
local Board of Education has been vested with the power,
authority, jurisdiction and discretion to contemplate and
cope with educational problems and considerations which
may arise on a local level.
Whether we adopt the doctrine of John Dewey that
the general objective of an education is a well-rounded,
happy life in order to get the most out of our existence or
the edict of Admiral Hyman Rickover that we must concentr-ate our education on the sciences necessary to survival, we should agree with all educators that one of the
major problems of our age i's the ''Drop Out'' of high
school students, and one of the prime factors contributing
to these ''drop outs'' is teenage marriages between high
school students.
What action ,should he taken to meet this challenge
and who should take the action~
It is one of the most sacred responsibilitie-s of parenthood, but the burden is also cast by ,statute upon the
Boar.d of Education. There is no fixed formula that has
yet been devised to control and guide the f.orces of nature
that are turned loose at that age in such great abundance
which ·could enable this Court or any other agency to decree by edict, a solution that either parent or school board
must follow. Only by the exercise of discretion, judgment
and the utmost patience and understanding can the proble-m even he approached and understood.
22
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Assuming that it is and should be a proper objective
of the Board to keep these youths in school, the Board
has as-sumed there are some things that can be done now:
(1) Not to permit students who disregard this good advice and marry prematurely to occupy positions of leadership and glamour and to wield great influence in the
eyes of other students in the s·chool ; and, ( 2) should students nevertheless fail to heed this warning and advice
given for their happiness, that they will then be expected
to hang up the toys of childhood and not be lured away
from marital and academic re·sponsibilities and duties by
the allurement of extracurricular activities that have
nothing whatsoever to do with the prescribed courses
required for graduation and necessary for a future, wellrounded life. This is in line with the law that make-s a
married man an adult and yet the Resolution enables him
to stay in school until graduation.
This program as establi·shed by the Resolution may
be halting; it may even be unwise; but it represents the
best judgment of the Board on this most diffi.cult -subject
and is within the discretionary power of the Board and
should not be disturbed by tbis Court.
The Court should not interfere with the exercise of
discretion by administrative Boards and Agencies as long
as there is a reasonable relationship between the aims
and objectives sought to be accomplished and the manner
in which the Board of Agency chooses to accomplish those
aims and objectives. This principle is succinctly summarized in 47 Am. Jur. 328, Schools, Section 47:
''Since the courts will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the school directors in mat23
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ters confided by law to their judgment, unless
there is a clear abuse of diseretion or a violation
of law, they are usually disinclined to interfere
with regulations adopted by school boards and
they will not consider whether the regulations are
wise or experient, but merely whether they are a
reasonable exercise of the power and discretion of
the board. The reasonableness of regulations is
a question of law for the courts. Acting reasonably
within the powers conferred, it is the province
of the board of education to determine what things
are detrimental to the successful management,
good order, and discipline of the schools and the
rules required to produce these eonditions. The
presumption is always in favor of the reasonableneB'S ,and propriety of a rule or regulation duly
made.''
In Gabrielli v. J(nickerbocker, 82 P. 2d 391, (California, 1938), the Supreme Court of California was
called upon to determine the reasonableness of a school
regul~ation requiring students to participate in a ceremony of saluting and pledging allegiance to the flag of
the United States. In determining that there was no violation of any article of the Federal or State Constitutions
and that the regulation was a reasonable exercise of administrative discretion the Court stated at page 394:
''The legislature has conferred upon school
boards broad plenary powers to make all reasonable regulations that will in the reasonable exercise of judgment promote the efficiency of the
school system in performing public welfare duties,
which are limited not merely to the development
of the mind in academic fields, but the sphere is
much broader and extends to those subjects which
will tend to develop and quicken the civic con24
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science in ways of attachment for home and country. It is only where its regulations are clearly
shown to be in violation of the fundamental law
that the courts, even though entertaining a different opinion from that of the governing boards
as to the wisdom or experiency of adopting social
regulations, may annul them. Many authorities
may be cited sustaining the action of school boards
in matters in which the wisdom of the board's action may be so highly controversial that a reasonable mind might well be divided as to the wisdorn
of the board's action. In such case,s, its action is
conclusive.
In State v. Chamberlain, 175 N.E. 2d 539 (Ohio
1961), the court held that the hoard of education did not
abuse its discretion in adopting a rule requiring pregnant
students to withdraw from school and that such exercise
was within the wide area of discretion vested in the
boaDd of education and the court would not interfere with
said exercise of discretion.
In Kissick v. Garland Independent School District,
330 S.W. 2d 708, (Texas, 1959') the local board of edu0ation had adopted a resolution providing that married
students or previously married students 'Should be restricted wholly to classroom work and barring them from
participating in athletics or other exhibitions and prohibiting them from holding cla~ss officHs or other positions
of honor other than academic honor such as valedictorian
and salutatoriaH. The .Supreme Court of Texas held that
such resolution was not arbitrary, nor capricious, nor discriminatory, nor unreasonable as applied to a high school
student who was previously m~arried, even though he had
been a letterman on the football team in prior years and
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was looking to an athletic scholarship and college. In
upholding the resolution of the school board the Supreme
Oourt of Texas, in the Kissick case referred to a de·cision
of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in State ex rel.
Thompson v. Marion County Board of Education, 302
S.\V. 2d 57 (Tennessee). The Tenne·ssee ease involved a
local school board which recognized that newly married
students generally have a detrimental effe·ct upon unmarr,ied students for a short time following their marriage.
In an effort to remedy this undesirable situation the local
board passed ·a resolution providing that student·s marrying during the term should be excluded from the s·chool
for the remaining part of that term, provided, however,
that they would be allowed to return to school the next
succeeding term. The Supreme Court of Texas referred
to that case as follows:
''In upholding this regulation as not amounting
to an abuse of discretion the Tennessee Supreme
Court made the following observation, with which
we agree: 'Boards of Eudctaion, rather than
courts, are charged with the important and difficult duty of operating the public schools . .So, it is
not a question of whether this or that individual
judge or court consider a given regulation adopted
by the board as expedient. The court's duty, regardless of its personal views, is to uphold the
board's regulation unless it is generally viewed as
being arbitrary and unreasonable. Any other
policy would result in confusion detrimental to the
progress and efficiency of our public school system.'''
Based upon the foregoing texts and authorities, Respondent Board of Education submits that it has the
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power, authority, jurisdiction and discretion to adopt
and enforce rules and regulations designed to promote
the general welfare, success and efficiency of the school
system and that the adoption of the Resolution of January 8, 1962 was a reasonable exercise. of ·said discretion
and in the best exercise of that disCTetion the members
of the Board of Education deemed its adoption necessary
and advisable for the more efficient administration and
promotion of the wel£are, success and efficiency of the
public schools within the Davis County 8chool District.

v.
ADOPTION OF SAID' RESOLUTION
DOES NOT DENY PLAINTIFF ANY FEDERAL OR STATE GUARANTEE OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW OR EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
Article III, Section 4 and Article X, Section 1 of the
Constitution of Utah provide that the Legislature shall
establish a system of public s·chools within the state of
Utah. Pursuant to these and other constitutional provisions, the Legislature has proceeded to create and establish a system of public schools within the state of Utah.
Pursuant to these and other constitutional provisions,
the legislature has proceeded to ·create and establish such
schools through the enactment of various statutory provis·ions found in Title 53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The provisions of Title 53 set forth curriculum requirements for the schools within the state of Utah. It should
be noted that the Resolution of January 8, 1962 is in no
manne•r at variance with these constitutional and statu-
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tory provisions. The Resolution does not in any manner
interfere with full and complete par.ticipation in the required educational curriculum and fulfillment of graduation requirements (R.53).
A similar resolution was affirmed against the same
constitutional attack·s in Cochrane v. Board of Education,
Supra, wherein the Michigan Supreme Court said in the
affirming opinion of Justice Kavanaugh: ''Plaintiff students were not prevented from obtaining an education.
They were merely denied the right to play on the high
school football team.''
The Supreme Court of Texas held in Kissick v. Garland Independent School District, Supr a, that a resolution of the s·chool district which provided that married
students or previously married students should be restricted wholly to class room w·ork and barring them from
participating in athletics or other exhibitions and prohibiting them from holding class offices or other positions
of honor other than academic honor was not void on the
ground that it deprived married high school students of
equal protection of the law or due process of law. (Italics
ours.) In reaehing this decision the Supreme Court of
Texas quoted and approved Board of Trustees of University of Missippi v. Waugh, 62 So. 827, (Mississippi,
1913).
1

The Waugh case involved a legis·lative enactment
·entitled ''An act to abolish and prohibit Greek lett~r
fraternities and sororities . . . among students at the
University of Missi~s~sippi and all other educational institutions supported in whole or in part by the state.'' In
28
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order to implement the provis~ons of this statute the trustees of the University of Mississippi required applicants
for admission to sign a pledge that they did not belong
to a fraternity and that they would not subsequently join
a fraternity. Plaintiff refused to sign such a pledge and
was therefore denied admission to the Univer1sity. l-Ie
thereafter brought an action alleging violations of the
state constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. In holding that here
had been no abridgment of any constitutional privileges
the Court stated at pages 830, 831:
"The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States was never intended to act as
an accomplice to any young man who wanted to
take advantage of the gratuitous advantages offered the youths to obtain an education, and yet
refuse to obey and submit to the disciplinary regulations enacted by the Legislature for the welfare
of the institutions of learning. The right to attend
the educational institutions of the state is not a
natural right. It is a gift of civilization, and benefaction of the law.''
The decision of the Supreme Court of Mci.ssi1ssippi
was subsequently appealed to and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Waugh v. Board of
Trustees, 237 U.S. 589,35 .S. Ct. 720,59 L. ed. 1131, (1915).
On appeal the appellant contended that the statute was
void and that its application by the Board of Trustees
was invalid because it did not apply equally to all ·students at the University of Missis·sipi. The Board of Trustees provided in its order that the statute was not to be
construed ''to apply to ·students already entered and who
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conduct themselves with that decorum always expected
of Southern Gentlemen.'' The Supreme Court of the
United States held that this provision in the order did
not render it invalid and that the statute in question was
not unconstitutional and affirmed the deci·sion of the Supreme Court of Mis·sissippi which had held there was no
violation of constitutional guarantees and particularly no
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment the Constitution
of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United
States answered appellant's contentions as follows:
''This order is assailed by Plaintiff as'' a clear discrimination between the 'ins' and the 'outs', between those in the University, and those who were
not on that date members of the student body,
and who might be desired to be admitted as such."
The contention i's made much of by counsel and
the order is denounced as irrational and arbitrary.
But counsel overlook that it is an obvious principle of construction, and .sometime·s of justice, that
laws are not to be construed retrospectively. The
trustees regarded and followed the principal and
left undisturbed the students already in the Uniwould be regarded as pledges not to abuse the
vel'lsity, admonishing, however, that their hono.r
right or indulgence. And whether it was a right
or an indulgence, it was based on an obvious and
rational distinction, and the Supreme Court (of
Mississippi) sustained its competence.
In reaching this decision the Court recognized that
however !audible and commendable were the aims and
obje·ctives of the fraternal organizations, it was s·till a
matter wit·hin the discretion of the legislature and trustees as to how they wished to deal with them.
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There is inherent in our governmental system, a
repugnance to adopting any rule, regulation, statute or
ordinance affecting the rights or sta,tus of individuals
retrospectively. It is the very basis of good government
that all such enactments shall operate prospectively, i.e.
upon those who thereafter act in derogation of newly
established policies.
While the,re are no rights involved in this rule relating to those who aspire to be student officers or to
wrestle on the school team, there was involved a proper
example for the Board of Education to exemplify governmental procedure; and the Board was wholly justified in
distinguishing between those who take an 3Jction affecting
their eligibility with full knowledge as to what the re,sult
will he and those who have already taken the step when
it would not affect their eligiblity.
In drawing a parallel hetween the W a;ugh case and
the matter now before the Court, it is noted that the
Board of Education of the Davis County School District
chose to implement the Resolution in mudh the same
manner as did the Board of Truste:es of the University
of Missis~sippi. The Board of Education deemed it to be
manifestly more fair, equitable and just to allow those
students who were presently participating in extracurricular activities to continue doing so until their graduation rathe·r than pre-emptorily to deprive them of these
fu.Il!Ctions without having given prior notice. How-ever,
as in the Waugh case, this continued participation was
not unqualified in that the Resolution provides : '' T'his
continued participation in either the holding of office or
in activities will be subject to good hehavior and proper
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execution of duty as determined by the school officials
concerned.'' In ehoosing this manner in which to implement the provisions of the Resolution, the Board of
Education thereby assured that all students not then
married would have know~edge of the new rule and be
aware of the fact that they would be subject to its provisions should they subsequently marry.
A number of other cases have supported similar
resolutions of local boards of education. In Holroyd v.
Eibling, 188 N.E. 2d 208, (Ohio, 1961), the court was
,called upon to consider a Board of Education regulation
making membership in certain high school fraternities a
bar to participation in high s·chool sponsored extracurricular activities including athletics, s:ervice, s;cholastic
and honor activities, which were conducted incidentally
to regular school work. In upholding this regulation the
Court said:
"It must be borne in mind that under this regulation, no student will be expelled from ~school or
denied a public education; nor will they be subject
to penal fine; they are simply required to choose
between school sponsored office and club affiliation.''
In determining that this was a valid regulation, the Court
made note of the fact that no student would be expelled
fron1 school or denied a public education. This is the
exact situation in the matte~r now before the court. The
Respondent Board of Education makes no attempt and
has no desire to expell any student from school or to interfere with his education by virtue of the Resolution or
in any other manner. It is the purpose and function of
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the school system to provide students with a basic education and to do so in the most desirable and efficient manner with the welfare of the students and community foremost in the minds of the sehool administrators. It was
with these ai·ms and objectives in mind that the Board
of Education adopted the Resolution of January 8, 1962.
Similar resolutions have been upheld by the courts
in .Webb v. State University o-f New York, 125 F . .Supp.
910, (1954) and Wilson v. Abilene Independent School
District, 190 S.W. 2d 406. In the latter case the Board of
Education passed a resolution requiring that all junior
and senior high s·chool ·students sign a pledge that they
did not belong to a fraternity and that they would not
join one. Failure to comply with the resolution resulted
in the .suspension of aH extracurricular activities. In upholding the resolution the court stated:
''In pursuance of this provi1sion (one almost identical to 53-6-20, Utah Code Annotated, 19·53), the
Leg'islature proceeded to establish a ·system of
schools, composed of various types of common
and independent districts, with boards of trustees
to admini1ster them. It cannot be doubted that the
constitutional provision quoted invested in the
Legislature full power and authority to do whatever is necessary to establd.sh and maintain an
"efficient" system of public free · schools, and
since it was neces~sary to establish and maintain
school districts to effectuate the provision, the
Legislature has the undoubted power and authority as may be necessary to accomplish the end
intended.
Such a ruling again withstood constitutional attack
in lsgrig v. Srygley, 197 S.W. 2d 39, (Ark., 1946). The
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court there held that rules of a school board making high
school students who participated in fraternities or ~sorori
ties ineligible for specified extracurricular activ[ties and
honors, did not violate the due proces·s clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
Stat·e·s and such rules were authorized by constitutional
provis·ions for maintenance of ''efficient system of f.ree
sehools '' and statute charging dire0tors with duty of
doing ·all things neces·sary and lawful for conduct of efficient public schools. The language us·ed there with reference to the delegation of power and authority to the
loeal board bears striking re•sen1blance to the language
of Section 53-6-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by which
the Legi.slature of the State of Utah has delegated to the
local Boards of Education the power and authority to
do all things needful for the maintenance and prosperity
of the schools and to make and enforce all needful rules
and regulations for the control and management of the
public schools of the district.
The legislatures of the various states have recognized that loc1al S{~hool administrator'S must have wide
latitude and discretion in administering the publi·c school
system and have a0cordingly conferred broad discretionary powers upon such local boa,rds. The courts have also
recognized the importance of these principles and have
refused to interfere with such admini,strative decis,ions
,and have, in doing so, made every effort to carry forth
this legislative intent.
The privilege of wrestling or playing baseball, or
us:heDing or being a class office·r, or otherwise to engage
in extracurricular activities, is not one of the rights pro34
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tected by the Constitutions of Utah or the United States.
There are certain rights which ·cannot be abridged
but the right to play ball or to be a class officer or otherwise represent the school in its extracurricular activities,
i•s not such a ri.ght.
Only such rights, privileges and immunities are are
the common rig.ht of all citizens are within the Constitutional guarantee.
This Court, in the case of Logan City School District
v. K ow allis, 94 U. 342, 77 P. 2d 348, has expressly stated
what those constitutional rights are ·so far as the schools
of this State are concerned. In dis·cussing the constitutional and statutory provisions involved herein this
Court said=
''The provision for being open does not apply to
matters financial; it does not mean they must be
free. It simply means tha.t all children mu.st have
equal r·ights and opportunity to attend the grade
or class of schoo-l for which such child is suited by
previous training or development." (Italics ours)

* * *
'' . . . A review of all the statutory enactment·s
from the beginning shows a recognition of the
policy that the ehildren must attend school within
the district in which they reside, wheneve~r there
is provided within such distr.ict, schools of proper
grade and class to meet their needs and requirements. When their home district provides a
school suitable in its curriculum, faculty, and facilities for their state of educational growth and
development, free and open to them, and reasonably convenient for attendance, they are given all
the Constitution assures or provides for them.
To secure to eve.ry child in the state the maximum
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benefit of the school system, the assignment of
ehi1dren to particular schools is often essential.
Economy and efficiency in sehool operation and
administration, as well as effe-ctuating and making
possible the harmonious development and growth
of all school children, would be seriously impaired
were students permitted to shift or change, at
their own voJ.ition, from one school to another."
(I taliocs ours)
It is not difficult to take some words out of context
and try to make the Constitutional guarantee apply to
everything embraced within the broad educational program for children and adults alike, a:s plaintiff is seeking
to do; but this Court has clearly recognized the distinction and, as was discussed by this Court in the Beard
case, where extracurricular activities were expressly
held to be within the broad aspects of the authority of
the Board, but not a part of the school curriculum reuqired by the Constitution.
Com•mon sense calls for that result. To hold otherwise could only lead to ahsurdity.
That which is not a common right for all cannot be
the subject of the Constitutional guarantee of equality.
Uta.h Mfrs. Assn. v. Stewart, 82 U. 198, 23 P. 2d 229.
The privilege of wrestling on the school team is in
the same category as the right to sell liquor, so far as
Constitutional guarantees are concerned, whi·ch this
Court said in the Stewart case is not one of the right;:;
guaranteed by either the State or Federal Constitution.
The leading case on this subject is. McAUliffe v. City
of New Bedford 29 N.E. 517 (Mas.s.).
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As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes in that case when
he was a member of the Massachusetts Court concHrning
the claim of a policeman who was removed from his job
for engaging in political activities:
''The petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman. ''
So here students may have a constitutional right to
attend school and to get married, but they have no constitutional right to hold class office or be on the wre,sHing
or baseba:ll team.
VI.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR
IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF
PLAINTIFF JAMES HAROLD STARKEY ON
THE GROUND THAT SAID PLAINTIFF IE,
OVER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
The Legislature of the state of Utah has provided
in Section 53-4-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that "In
each school district the public schools shall be free to all
children between the ages of six and eighteen years who
are residents of said district.'' The record clearly shows
that Plaintiff James Harold Starkey is over eighteen
ye,ars of age, in that he was born on October 20, 1944.
The Statute qouted above is explicit in requiri·ng the
Board of Education to furnish free education only to
those students between the ages of six and eigihteen years.
Should there be any question as to the meaning of the
phrase ''between the ages of .six and eighteen years,"
Respondent refers the Court to the following cases in
which it was held that such language means that pe,riod
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of ti~me between the sixth anniversary of the child's birth
and the eighteenth anniversary of a child's birth:

Gibson v. People, 99 P. 333
Knott v. Rawlings, 9·6 N.W. 2d 900 (Iowa)
Bay Trust Company v. Agricultural Life Insurance Company, 271 N.W. 749 (l\fi0higan)
Green v. Patriotic Order Sons of America, 87 S.E.
2d 14, (North Carol,ina)
In Bay Trust Company v. Agricultu.ral Life Insuran.ce Company, Supra, the JusHce writing the opinion
had a rather unique way or expres·sing the Court's interpretation of s,imilar language when he said:
"A year is a unit of time, a foot a unit of distance,
and a pound a unit of weight. The deceased had
lived over, beyond, above or in exces's of age of
60 calendar years, that i.s, sixty year.s two months
and ten days when he came to his death. The record does not show his height and weight. It would
involve strange reasoning to assure that if he
were 5' 101/2'' tall that he was not over five feet,
or that he weighed 175 pounds that he did not tip
the scales any point over 100 pounds. If this
opinion with respect to the claim of the beneficiary i·s 1,975 words, it would be likewise strange
to claim that it is not over 1,000 words in length."
The Statute is thus clear in its indication that the
Board of Education has no duty or obligation to furnish
a free education to those persons who have ce'lehrated
the eighteenth anniversary of their birth. This does not,
however, mean that the Legislature has provided no
means for their education, nor does it mean that the
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Board of Education may not permit such persons to remain in school until such time as they may graduate.
Here again Plaintiff has e-rected a "strawman ". Neither
the Resolution nor the Board of Education nor the Legislahue nor the Court has so construed the action of the
Board of Education so as to preclude plaintiff from attending school to the end of the school year and the Legislature has expresrsly endowed the Board of Education
with authority to provide for the education of plaintiff
and others similarly situated by either continuing them
in their present status till the end of the school year or
by enrolling in the Adult Education Program as set forth
in Title 53, Chapter 30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Section 53-3-3 of the Act provides that every district
may raise and appropriate funds for adult education and
hire teachers and e~stablish and maintain classes for
adult education. Section 53-30-10 defines the term
"Adult" as "A person of 18 years of age or over, or any
pe~rson who has completed a high school course as prescribed by the state department of public instruction."
The Respondent Board of Education has established an
Adult Education Program puDsuant to the Legislative
directive found in Title 53, Chapter 30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the Plaintiff James Harold Starkey,
or any other person who is an adult within the meaning·
of the Adult Education Law, may provide for and continue his education under the adult education program.
The Legislature has made adequate provision for the
continued education of persons over 18 years of age. In
reading Section 53-4-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in
conjunction with the provisions of the Adult Education
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Law, Plaintiff James Harold Starkey, might be required
to continue his education in the Adult Education Pro~
gra,m. This has not, however, been the policy of the
Board of Education as will be pointed out below.
Notwithstanding the emancipation of plaintiff under
the provisions of Section 15-2-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, , by virtue of his marriage, and notwithstanding
plaintiff having reached an age beyond the statutory
guarantee of free education, the Board of Education was
nevertheless ve~ted with discretionary power to extend
plaintiff's education in the regular school to the date of
his graduation, which it did, and plaintiff was not deprived of any constitutional or statutory right entitling
him to free education. Plaintiff's argument on thi.s point
is pure sophistry.
Plaintiff asserts on page 12 on his brief that to allow
the Board of Education to furnish education or facilities
free of charge to chHdren who have celebrated their
eighteenth birthday may constitute a misappropriation
of public funds.
The Board of Education denies that this would so
constitute a misappropriation of public funds. The statute provides for education of children between the ages
of six and eighteen yea,rs and also provides for the appropriation of funds to cover the Adult Education Progranl. In implementing this statutory provision, the
Board of Education may allow five year old children
to enter the first grade provided they reach their sixth
birthday within a few weeks or months after the beginning of school. Should P.lantiff's reasoning be adopt40
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ed this would mean that the Board of Education was
misappropriating public funds by allowing these five
year old students to enter school before their sixth
birthday. Tlhis line of reasoning has not been adopted
by the Courts. The right to establish a so-·called ''cut-off
date" has been recognized and approved by the Courts.
See Harkins v. School District No. 4, 288 P. 2d 777,
(Arizona, 1955). And State ex rel. Ronish v. School District No. 1, 348 p. 2d 797, (Montana, 1960). The ·latter
case is annotated along with other cases supporting the
proposition that a ScJhool Board has the authority to
admit students who have not yet attained six years of
age. The annotation is found at 78 A.L.R. 2d 1021.
The foregoing authorities sustain the proposition
that it is discretionary with the Board of Education as
to whether or not it will admit students who have not
yet attained six years of age and, conversely, it is discretionary with the Board of Education as to whether
or not it will allow and permit ,students to remain in
regular school after they have celebrated their eighteenth
birthday.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit:
1. Writs of Prohibition or Mandate are basically
inapplicable to activities involving discretionary powers;
2. .Adoption of the resolution was not arbitrary or
capricious, nor an abuse of discretion; nor a violation of
any Federal or State constitutional right or privilege
of plaintiff. On the contrary, it was a reasonable exer-
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cise of discretion by the Board in its efforts to carry
out its responsibilities and the directions and mandates
of the Legislature as to the objectives to be accomplished
for the happiness and well-being of all of the students;
3. Under the Constitution and the Statutes of Utah
the ultimate responsibility fo,r the educational result on
the students, and for the impact on the community as
a whole is on the Board of Education. This Court
sihould sustain, not vitiate, the action of the Board in
its eff·orts to meet its responsibilities.
In conclusion we commend to this Court the language
of the Supreme Court of Oregon in Burkitt v. Scho·ol
Dist. No. 1, 246 P. 2d 566 (1952), in sustaining the action
of the School Board in suppressing social clubs, wherein the Court was speaking of the relative rights, duties,
and responsibilities of students, parents, Boa,rds and
the Courts, in the following words :
"When they avail themselves of that opportunity
they must, in the nature of things, submit to the
discipline of the schools and to regulations reasonably calculated to promote such discipline and
the high purpose for which the sc·hools are established - the education of youth, which is not
limited to the imparting of knowledge, but includes as well the development of character and
preparation for the assumption of the responsibilities of citizenship in a democracy. To attain
these ends not the least in value of the lessons
to be learned are the lessons of self-restraint,
self-discipline, tolerance, and respect for duly
constituted authority. In this regard parents
and the schools have their respective rights and
duties, which complement one another, and may
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be exercised and discharged in cooperation for
the welfare of the child and the state.
"Here, as it seems us, for the court to interfere
with the action of the school authorities no·w
challenged would be little less than to con.stitute
ourselves a school board for all the schools of the
state. This is something we have neither the
right no.r the inclination to do."

RespectfulJy submitted,
KING & KING and
H. ARNOLD RICH, Esq.
Attorneys fo.r Respondent
202-203 Bmith Building
Clearfield, Utah
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